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Implicit taxes are defined as the pre-tax rate of return disadvantage earned on an investment that 
is taxed preferentially.  Implicit tax theory predicts that implicit taxes will fully offset any benefit 
from preferential tax treatment leading to no benefit from lower explicit taxes; however, implicit 
tax theory assumes perfect market competition.  This paper relaxes the assumption of perfect 
market competition and finds that firms in industries with lower competition bear lower implicit 
taxes, and firms in industries with higher competition bear higher implicit taxes.  These findings 
are consistent with firms in industries with less competition having price setting power.  Further, 
these findings are consistent with competition forcing firms in high competition industries to 
pass along tax savings to customers while firms in low competition industries can retain more of 
their tax savings.  These findings further answer the call in the literature for more research on 
determinants of cross-sectional variation in implicit taxes (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001).     
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Section I:  Introduction  
U.S tax law provides firms with tax preferences through reduced tax rates, tax credits, higher 
and earlier deductions, delayed income recognition, exemptions, etc. (Scholes et al. 2015).  All 
else equal, this will encourage firms to increase investment in tax preferred areas, thus increasing 
the supply of outputs. In a perfectly competitive market this increase in output supply will drive 
down output price and reduce the rate of return in tax preferred areas (Jennings et al. 2012).  
Implicit tax theory holds that investment continues to increase in these tax preferred areas until 
there is no after tax rate of return difference between investing in a tax preferred versus non-tax 
preferred area (Nicholson 2005).  This reduced pre-tax rate of return on an investment that is taxed 
preferentially is the implicit tax (Scholes et al. 2015). Using a large sample of U.S. firms, I seek to 
document whether variation in market competition impacts implicit tax formation. My work 
complements prior research that examines variation in explicit taxes (i.e. effective tax rates) 
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) and answers the call from Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) and 
Scholes et al. (2015) for more research that considers firms’ entire tax burdens – both implicit and 
explicit. Because most existing tax research focuses only on firms’ explicit tax burdens and has 
not attempted to measure and include implicit taxes in the analyses, the findings from these studies 
present a potentially incomplete picture of US corporations’ tax burdens (Hanlon and Heitzman 
2010).   
Markets lie along a spectrum that ranges from perfectly competitive to monopolistic 
(Nicholson 2005). Economic theory suggests that in perfectly competitive markets implicit taxes 
will rise to fully offset any benefit from reducing explicit taxes (Scholes et al. 2015).  Similarly, 
theory predicts that in monopolistic settings implicit taxes may be closer to zero and firms may 
retain more of their explicit tax preferences. However, in the U.S. economy monopolies or perfect 
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competition are unlikely to hold and in reality, most firms participate in markets that lie somewhere 
between these two extremes.  Firms can face competition on the input side on what they purchase 
to produce their goods or services or on the supply side on what they sell to customers.  Consistent 
with prior research (e.g., Kubick et al. 2015 and Chyz, Gaertner, and Laplante 2014), I focus on 
the supply side in this paper because measurement of competition on the supply side is much more 
straightforward.  Kubick et al. (2015) and Chyz, Gaertner, and Laplante (2014) similarly focus on 
the supply side and both find results that they attribute to competitive market forces.  Specifically, 
Kubick et al. (2015) finds that firms with higher product market power (i.e., less competition) 
engage in more tax avoidance, and Chyz et al. (2014) find that firms selling products with less 
elastic demand (i.e., potentially less competition) avoid more taxes than firms with more elastic 
demand.  Similar to this paper, both of these papers focus on the supply side (the output side of 
what firms are producing and/or selling).   
However, the competitiveness of the firms’ input side could influence my results.  There is 
reason to believe that the competitiveness of the input side for firms is similar to the demand side.  
If firms sell goods in a competitive market, then they are likely competing over the same inputs to 
production.  In Appendix 2, in Figures 2 and 4, I show the effect on the price of goods if the supply 
increases under perfect competition and in a monopoly, respectively.  In both instances, price 
decreases; however, the level of price decreases may be different between the two scenarios.  
Without controlling for the competitiveness of the demand of the inputs, interpretation of my 
results may be limited.    On the demand side, Appendix 2, Figures 1 and 5 demonstrate the effect 
of an increase in demand under perfect competition or in a monopoly situation.  In both situations 
a price increase occurs, but the degree of increase may differ between the two scenarios.   
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Prior research suggests that implicit taxes are generally not as high as would be expected in a 
perfectly competitive market (e.g., Ayers et al. 2000, Berger 1993, Engel et al. 1999, Erickson and 
Wang 1999, Guenther 1994, Henning and Shaw 2000, Miller 1977, Shackelford 1991, Stickney et 
al. 1983, Key 2008). Whether the findings from this prior research can be explained by measurable 
and predictable deviations from perfect market competition is an empirical question. To answer 
this question, I estimate market competition at the NAICS industry level using market 
concentration ratios of the top four firms and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) (Callihan and 
White 1999).  I then modify and extend the methodology developed in Jennings et al. (2012) to 
test variation in implicit tax differences arising from industry level competition.  I provide detail 
of these tests in Section III.     
I find that implicit taxes are lower for firms in industries with lower competition and higher in 
industries with higher competition as predicted by theory.  Firms in industries with low 
competition (closer on the spectrum to a monopoly) appear to be able to retain some of the tax 
preference benefits whereas firms in industries that are more competitive have more of their 
explicit tax preference benefits eliminated by implicit taxes.   
There are other reasons why prices would not fully respond to changes in supply including 
externalities, public goods, and imperfect information (Nicholson 2005). I focus on imperfect 
competition for several reasons.  Competition can be reliably measured using several generally 
accepted measures.  Further, competition can be measured for all industries unlike externalities 
and public goods, which may only be an issue for certain industries.   
My findings should be of interest to managers, researchers, and tax policy makers. The 
accounting and finance literatures typically characterize firms’ tax outcomes as reflecting a 
strategic focus or “investment” in tax minimization or tax planning (Mills et al. 1998). In other 
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words, managers expend resources to minimize taxes (Chyz et al., 2016a, Chyz et al., 2014).  My 
results show that increased market competition will offset some of the benefits from paying lower 
explicit taxes.  The results may help explain the “undersheltering puzzle” visited in prior literature 
– i.e., why more tax avoidance does not occur (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Weisbach 2001).  
Finally, my results inform tax policy by documenting sources of variation in implicit taxes. The 
existence of implicit taxes can provide a signal to policy makers that legislated tax preferences 
effectively incentivized a targeted area. At the same time policy makers will want to predict 
whether legislated tax preferences could lead to changes in firms’ total tax burdens.1  
The remainder of my paper is structured as follows.  Section II discusses prior research and 
develops my hypothesis.  Section III outlines my sample selection procedures, variable definitions, 











                                                          
1 In future research, it would be interesting to examine rifle-shot provisions and implicit taxes.  I would expect that 
rifle-shot provisions that lower explicit taxes that impact a single firm (or small number of firms) rather than an 
entire industry would be less subject to offsets in benefits in the form of implicit taxes than tax policies that impact 
an entire industry or large group of firms.   
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Section II: Prior Research and Hypothesis Development 
a. What do we know about explicit and implicit taxes?  
The literature regarding explicit U.S. corporate tax burdens is extensive and well 
developed.  For example, prior literature finds a number of determinants of explicit taxes including 
firm size, capital structure, asset mix, profitability, international operations, tax shelter usage, 
compensation on pre-tax versus post-tax income, equity-based compensation, concentration of 
ownership, whether the tax department is a profit center, tax director compensation contracts, and 
top executive characteristics (Armstrong et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2010; Desai and Dharmapala 
2006; Dyreng et al. 2010; Gupta and Newberry 1997; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Phillips 2003; 
Rego 2003; Robinson et al. 2010; Zimmerman 1983).  However, this prior literature generally 
estimates tax burdens without directly measuring implicit taxes.   
Implicit taxes arise as reductions in the benefits of explicit tax preferences.  First, capital 
is attracted to tax-favored investments (or projects with lower explicit tax rates).  As companies 
invest more and more capital in these tax favored projects, the supply curve shifts to the right (see 
Appendix 2 for an illustration).  Eventually, in a perfectly competitive market, risk adjusted after 
tax rates of return will equalize among differentially taxed projects or firms (Jennings et al. 2012).  
Implicit taxes are thus the pre-tax return disadvantage that equalizes after tax rates of return.  
Implicit tax theory predicts that implicit taxes will fully offset explicit tax benefits leading to no 
benefit from investing in tax advantaged projects.  This can also be looked at as a total tax burden 
story where in a perfectly competitive economy, the total tax burden, calculated as the sum of 
explicit and implicit taxes, is the same across projects and across firms (Callihan and White 1999).  
However, prior research suggests that the total tax burden varies and implicit taxes do not always 
fully offset explicit tax benefits (Wilkie 1992; Jennings et al. 2012).      
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Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) and Scholes et al. (2014) remind researchers and policy 
makers to consider “all taxes” in our analyses and that ignoring implicit taxes leaves a gap in our 
understanding.  Prior research in implicit taxes measures implicit taxes at an aggregated asset level 
or at a firm level.  Implicit taxes at the asset level are easier to conceptualize relative to implicit 
taxes at a firm level.  Consider for example the case of municipal bonds.  Interest from municipal 
bonds is generally not taxed to an investor, while interest from corporate bonds of comparable risk 
are subject to investor level taxation.  However, one would expect differences in taxation to be 
reflected in the pre-tax rates of return.  One would expect corporate bonds to have higher pre-tax 
returns than municipal bonds of comparable risk.  One would also expect equal after tax rates of 
return between municipal and corporate bonds of comparable risk in a perfectly competitive 
economy.  The lower pre-tax rate of return for tax favored municipal bonds is the implicit tax.   
The ease of interpretation is likely to explain why much of the prior literature on implicit 
taxes has measured or examined variation in implicit taxes at an asset level (Ayers et al. 2000; 
Berger 1993; Engel et al. 1999; Erickson and Wang 1999; Guenther 1994; Henning and Shaw 
2000; Miller 1977; Shackelford 1991; Stickney et al. 1983, Key 2008).  Though a simplified 
interpretation, if we consider firms to be collections of investments made (assets purchased) and 
returns received then much of the same theory and logic that assists with understanding implicit 
taxes at the asset level can be extended to capture implicit taxes at the firm level.  There are distinct 
advantages with attempting to capture implicit taxes at the firm level.  Measuring implicit taxes at 
the firm level allows for better comparisons with much of the extant explicit tax literature that also 
uses firm level measures (Callihan and White 1999, Chyz et al. 2016b; Jennings et al. 2012; 
Salbador and Vendrzyk 2006; Markle et al. 2016).  Prior research at the firm level finds that full 
implicit tax formation is impacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) (Jennings et al. 2012), 
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market power within niche industries or investments (Salbador and Vendrzyk 2006; Shackelford 
1991; Stickney et al. 1983), aggressive tax planning (Jennings et al. 2012), tax shelter use (Jennings 
et al. 2012), multinational operations (Chyz et al. 2016b), and ability to shift income (Markle et al. 
2016). 
 Miller (1977) discusses, among many things, the implicit taxes borne by holders of tax-
preferred versus fully taxable corporate bonds.  Stickney et al. (1983) examines a specific company 
– General Electric and subsidiaries – and finds evidence of implicit taxes on the tax preference 
benefits of tax transfer leasing.  Shackelford (1991) studies a unique setting involving employee 
stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and finds that tax preferences for ESOPs incur implicit taxes.  
Berger (1993) investigates implicit taxes related to the 1981 Research and Development (R&D) 
tax credit and finds evidence of implicit taxes by isolating the impact of spending increases for 
R&D related to price increases (input price increases would be evidence of implicit taxes) versus 
volume increases.  Guenther (1994) finds evidence of implicit taxes on treasury bills by comparing 
pre-tax returns of treasury bills around the rate changes (i.e. December versus January).  Engel et 
al. (1999) find support for small but lower than theory predicts levels of implicit taxes for trust 
preferred stock by examining the rate of return investors were willing to accept for financial 
instruments identical except for the taxability of the interest/dividends.  Erickson and Wang (1999) 
find evidence of implicit taxes in a specific transaction between two firms in which huge tax 
savings were achieved for one party; however, evidence of implicit taxes shows that at least a 
portion of the benefits were transferred to the other party via lower stock transfer prices.   Ayers 
et al. (2000) analyzes the goodwill amortization deduction enactment and finds support that this 
tax preference (goodwill amortization deduction) generated implicit taxes by analyzing the relation 
between pre-existing goodwill and acquisition premiums before and after the enactment of the act 
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allowing the deduction of goodwill amortization from qualifying corporate acquisitions.  Henning 
and Shaw (2000) examine changes around the tax deductibility of goodwill and find evidence of 
implicit taxes for this tax preference.  Key (2008) examines implicit taxes for a unique sample of 
racehorse purchases where some are allowed bonus depreciation and finds evidence of implicit 
taxes but below the level theory predicts.   
My paper builds upon this asset-level and firm-level research and will contribute to this 
literature stream by examining on a large scale one very important determinant of implicit taxes: 
market competitiveness. 
The two papers most related to this study are Salbador and Vendrzyk (2006) and Callihan 
and White (1999).  Callihan and White (1999) it is determined in Wright (2001) actually measures 
tax preferences rather than implicit taxes.  And thus, their findings essentially can be interpreted 
as firms in more competitive industries have higher tax preferences.  In my delta analysis test, I 
control for tax preferences and measure implicit taxes as the reduction in the benefit of the explicit 
tax preferences.  This approach effectively controls for tax preferences.  I leave it to future research 
to determine the interactive effect of tax preferences, implicit taxes, and competition.  Salbador 
and Vendrzyk (2006) look at a niche industry – the defense contracting industry – and make 
assertions based on market power within this niche industry.  Their results are limited to the 
particular industry, whereas my results are potentially more generalizable across a population.     
A discussion of implicit taxes is incomplete without a short discussion of tax incidence.  
Tax incidence relates to who bears the tax.  For explicit taxes, if an increase in explicit taxes can 
be passed through to a firm’s customers through higher sales prices, then the customer bears the 
increased explicit taxes.  Theoretical tax incidence literature generally determines that corporate 
tax incidence falls on the less mobile input factors, generally labor and services or capital (when 
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mobility of capital varies) (Harberger 2008; Gravelle 2008).  Researchers typically examine tax 
incidence at an economy level and examine which groups bear the tax overall.   While the incidence 
literature does not address implicit taxes directly, evidence in the incidence literature suggests that 
changes in economy-wide explicit taxes are borne to some extent by suppliers, employees, and 
customers and not just shareholders.  This supports the notion that changes in implicit taxes offset 
at least some of the changes in explicit taxes (Jennings et al. 2012).  The incidence of an explicit 
tax change can be borne by the firm itself or the input or output factors of the firm (i.e., suppliers 
and customers).  Prior literature suggests that firms may take into account their ability (or inability) 
to pass on tax savings or costs to other parties when making investments into tax avoidance (Chyz 
et al. 2014).  Although it complements and helps clarify implicit tax research, incidence is not the 
focus of this paper and is left for future research.     
As discussed, implicit tax theory predicts equal total tax burdens (calculated as the sum of 
explicit and implicit taxes) across firms (Callihan and White 1999).  In other words, implicit taxes 
should fully offset any benefit from lowering explicit taxes.  While prior literature has found 
evidence that rejects implicit taxes fully offsetting all explicit tax preference benefits and total tax 
burdens not being perfectly equal across all firms, evidence supports the existence of varying 
degrees of implicit taxes (Jennings et al. 2012; Callihan and White 1999; Wilkie 1992).  The 
general framework holds that the more a market diverges from being perfectly competitive (via 
lower market competitiveness), the more likely implicit taxes do not fully offset explicit tax 
benefits, as would be expected in a perfectly competitive market.  Measuring market power as 
industry market concentration and a firm’s market share, Callihan and White (1999) find evidence 
that the use of tax preferences varies with market competition.2  Further, Salbador and Vendrzyk 
                                                          
2 Callihan and White (1999) make claims regarding how implicit taxes vary with competition; however, Wright 
(2001) proves that their methodology was actually measuring tax preferences and not implicit taxes.   
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(2006) find that in a very small industry, ability to set prices (i.e., more monopolistic) reduces 
implicit taxes at the firm level.  How market competition impacts the degree of implicit tax 
formation has not been examined in the literature.  My research fills this gap by examining market 
competition’s impact on implicit tax formation, which is a natural test as implicit tax theory relies 
on the assumption of perfect competition.   
b. Hypothesis Development  
Implicit taxes arise due to increased demand or supply for a tax preferred asset or 
investment.  From the supply side, suppose Congress allows for 50 percent immediate expensing 
on the purchase of equipment through bonus depreciation thus creating a tax preference.  Due to 
this tax preference, firms purchase more equipment driving up supply of whatever they are 
producing.  This leads to lower selling prices for the firms output, leading to lower pre-tax returns. 
This is the supply effect.  Appendix 2, Figure 2 shows this scenario.  In a perfectly competitive 
market, as the supply in the particular industry increases and shifts the supply curve to the right, 
the equilibrium point shifts driving the output price down on the outputs in the industry (Nicholson 
2005).  Supply increases in the industry and shifts the output price down to the point at which the 
equilibrium price equals the average cost in the industry, leading to zero profits (or no benefit for 
investing in the tax preferred item, i.e., equipment in this example) (Nicholson 2005).  On the flip 
side, suppose this bonus depreciation is limited to a single firm that operates as a monopoly.  In a 
monopoly, a firm operates at the point at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost (Nicholson 
2005; Chamberlin 1933).  Figures 3 and 4 show the monopoly supply scenario.  A tax preference 
for the firm operating in a monopoly shifts the marginal cost curve down, leading to a change in 
the equilibrium intersection of marginal cost and marginal revenue (Nicholson 2005; Chamberlin 
1933).  This generally leads to an increase in quantity produced and in price.  However, monopolies 
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can earn a positive profit as profit = (price – average cost)*quantity, where price is greater than or 
equal to average cost.  If a firm operates in a monopoly, the firm is not forced to shift the entire 
benefit of the tax preference (via lower pre-tax return, in this case lower price) to the customers as 
is the case in a perfectly competitive market (Nicholson 2005).  Figure 3 shows an example of how 
a monopoly chooses the point at which to produce (where marginal cost (MC) equals marginal 
revenue (MR)), and Figure 4 shows how this looks on a traditional supply and demand graph.  
Figure 5 shows the effect on price if the supplier operates in a monopoly and demand increases.  
In this case, supply produced does not change, and thus price is driven up.  As the focus in this 
paper is on the supply curve, Figures 2 and 4 are most relevant.         
Even though implicit tax theory suggests that I will find implicit taxes increasing in 
competition, I may not find results in my sample if all industries in my sample are competitive 
enough to cause implicit taxes to form.  The Federal Trade Commission is tasked with the job of 
identifying and breaking up monopolies that exist that exhibit unfair trade practices such as price 
fixing (Averitt 1980).  Therefore, industries in the United States may not vary enough in their 
competitiveness for identification of a relation between implicit taxes and competition.   
Implicit tax theory implies that implicit taxes arise in the presence of tax preferences to 
fully offset the benefits of explicit tax preferences (Callihan and White 1999).  Implicit tax theory 
assumes perfect competition.  In a non-perfectly competitive market, implicit taxes may not fully 
offset the benefits of tax preferences leading to lower implicit taxes than would be expected in a 
perfectly competitive market (Callihan and White 1999).  This theory leads to my hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Firms in industries with lower competition bear lower implicit taxes than 




Section III:  Sample Selection Procedures, Variable Definitions, and Research Methodology  
a. Sample Selection Procedures 
I begin with all U.S. firms with available data in Compustat in the years 2002, 2007, and 
2012.  I use these three years because I require Census data to calculate my variables of interest, 
and the Census data is only produced every 5 years.  I use the Census data to determine total 
industry sales within an industry. Compustat data captures only the public firms, and prior 
literature has suggested that this data biases results when measuring competition (Ali, Klasa, and 
Yeung 2009).3  Further, I require return on equity (ROE) to be not greater than one nor less than 
zero, positive tax expense, positive pre-tax income, and positive stockholders’ equity.  I further 
require total assets of at least $10 million and pre-tax income of at least $500,000.  My sample is 
further reduced by requiring Census industry level data.4  I impose these requirements following 
Jennings et al. (2012) as these requirements increase the likelihood that low effective tax rates 
found in the sample are due to tax preferences from profitable firms as opposed to current year 
losses or low profits.  The return on equity requirement removes outliers that are likely due to 
extreme situations or incorrect data.  This results in 7,687 firm-year observations for my main 
tests.5  Table 1 shows the effect each requirement has on the sample size.  At the two digit NAICS 
level, this results in 21 industries represented in the sample with firm-year observations per 
industry ranging from 28 observations to 1,626 observations.6  This breakdown by industry is 
shown in Table 2. 
 
                                                          
3 Ali et al. (2009) find that many prior studies that use Compustat based industry measures cannot be confirmed 
using Census based industry measures.   
4 For my main sample, I require firms to merge at the 2 digit NAICS level with the census data.  
5 My main results hold if firms with NOL carryforwards are excluded.  Excluding firms with NOL carryforwards 
results in a sample of 5,376 firms.   
6 I use the NAICS industry sales total from the Census data as this includes all firms and not just public firms.  My 
main results hold if I use the 3 digit NAICS instead of the 2 digit NAICS.   
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b. Variable Definitions, Research Methodology, and Results  
I use a modified and expanded version of the research methodology from Jennings et al. 2012.  
Using four main tests, I examine implicit taxes for firms in industries with low and high 
competition.  I define competition by using Callihan and White’s (1999) concentration ratio and 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI).  The concentration ratio (CR4) is defined as the total 
revenue for the top four firms by two digit NAICS7, divided by the total sales for the industry 
(Callihan and White 1999).  The HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm and 
summing across two digit NAICS.  The concentration ratio and the HHI capture whether an 
industry is dominated by a few large players.  The higher the concentration ratio or HHI, the more 
an industry is dominated by a few large players and thus the more imperfect the market is (closer 
on the spectrum to a monopoly).  Higher concentration ratios or HHI indicate less  competition in 
an industry, and lower concentration ratios or HHI indicate more competition in an industry.  The 
other main variables of interest are GAAP effective tax rate (GAAP_ETR defined as tax expense 
divided by pre-tax income), return on equity (ROE defined as net income divided by beginning of 
year shareholders’ equity), and pretax return on equity (PTROE defined as pretax income divided 
by beginning of year shareholders’ equity).  The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3 and are 
shown for all firm-years.8  Panel A of Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for all firms-years in the 
sample, and Panels B and C show the descriptive statistics for firm-years in industries with high 
and low competition, respectively as defined by HIGH_CR4=0 and HIGH_CR4=1, respectively.  
In panel A, I show that the average GAAP effective tax rate (GAAP_ETR) for the sample is 
                                                          
7 I use the historical NAICS throughout and for simplicity refer only to NAICS (as opposed to NAICSH).   
8 PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL ASSETS, LEVERAGE, CAP, INV, and RD are winsorized at 1 
percent and 99 percent.  My main results hold if these variables are not winsorized.  My results further hold if I 
exclude NOL carryforward firm-years and do not winsorize.  Leone et al. (2015) show winsorizing may bias some 
results.  My results do not appear to be biased due to winsorizing.     
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0.3210, the average return on equity (ROE) is 0.1556, and the average pre-tax return on equity 
(PTROE) is 0.2312.  Variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
i. High v. Low Tax Preference Groups 
In my first set of tests, I examine firms in industries with high and low competition as measured 
by concentration ratios and HHI below and above the median.  Within each group, I compare the 
firms with high (low) and low (high) tax preferences (GAAP ETRs).  I define PTROE as pretax 
income divided by shareholders’ equity and TAX as tax expense divided by shareholders’ equity.  
TAX as defined here represents the reduction in after tax return on equity due to explicit taxes 
(Jennings et al. 2012).  In Table 4, Panel A, I first divide the sample into low competition (high 
CR4, ≥ median CR4 by year) and high competition (low CR4, < median CR4 by year).  I further 
divide each subsample into high-tax and low-tax groups.  The high-tax group represents the firms 
in each subsample by year that have the highest 40 percent of the GAAP_ETR distribution (lowest 
tax preferences), while the low-tax group represents the firms in each subsample by year that have 
the lowest 40 percent of the GAAP_ETR distribution (high tax preferences).  I then take the 
differences in PTROE and TAX by high- and low-tax for each subsample (high and low 
competition).  I am looking for whether as a group firms in high and low competition groups have 
differences, on average, in how much of their explicit tax advantage is offset by a pre-tax return 
disadvantage.  If firms in less competitive industries bear lower implicit taxes than firms in more 
competitive industries, I will find a higher portion of the explicit tax benefit for firms in high 
competition industries is offset by a pre-tax return disadvantage than for firms in low competition 
industries.   
For the low competition (CR4) subsample, I find that the TAX difference is 0.0455, which 
indicates that firms in the low-tax group have a 4.55 percent after tax return advantage to firms in 
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the high-tax group by paying lower GAAP_ETRs.  If implicit tax theory holds, I should see an 
offsetting PTROE reduction for firms in the low-tax group.  For the low competition (CR4) 
subsample, I find that high-tax firms have only a 2.04 percent pre-tax return advantage to firms in 
the low-tax group.  The ratio of the PTROE and TAX differences for the low competition industry 
(CR4) firms of 44.84 percent indicates that firms in the low-tax industries can reduce their taxes 
and only incur an offsetting pre-tax return disadvantage of around 44.84 percent of the explicit tax 
savings.  This is inconsistent with perfect implicit tax theory that suggests implicit taxes will 
through a pre-tax return disadvantage offset the entire benefit of lowering explicit taxes.   
For the second subsample in Table 4, Panel A, I find that for firms in industries that are more 
competitive with low CR4, over 100 percent of the explicit tax benefits of low-tax firms are offset 
by a pre-tax return disadvantage on average.  I specifically find that 129.76 percent of the explicit 
tax benefit (the 0.0562 difference in TAX between the high and low tax groups for high 
competition firms) is offset by a pre-tax return disadvantage (a disadvantage of 0.0729, which is 
the difference in PTROE between the high and low tax groups in the low CR4/ high competition 
column).  There are several potential explanations for why this value is over 100 percent.  In a 
perfect market, I would expect this value to be no more than 100 percent, which would indicate 
that 100 percent of the explicit tax benefits are eliminated via implicit taxes through pre-tax return 
reductions.  One reason this value could be over 100 percent is that the measure is noisy.  As I am 
trying to capture variation between the two groups (high and low competition), I am not concerned 
with noise influencing my inferences here because I have no reason to suspect that one group is 
influenced more or less than the other by noise.  Another possible reason for this over 100 percent 
value could be that firms are overreacting and expending excess resources to lower their taxes.  If 
this is true, some firms may be working to lower their explicit taxes to the detriment of their pre-
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tax return leading to lower after tax profits, and if this is the case these firms may be better served 
to expending less resources to lowering explicit taxes.  Overreaction and non-optimal tax related 
decisions has been documented in other literature, particularly the economics literature (Chetty, 
Looney, and Kroft 2009; Goldin and Homonoff 2013).   
In Panel B, I substitute HHI for CR4 and find consistent results.  Specifically, I find that for 
firms in low competition industries, approximately 34.44 percent of the explicit tax benefit for low 
tax firms is offset by a pre-tax return disadvantage (or implicit tax).  And firms in high competition 
industries bear an offsetting pre-tax return disadvantage of 130.30 percent.  Thus, for this first test, 
I find support that firms in industries with less competition exhibit an ability to bear lower implicit 
taxes. 
ii. Correlations 
Next I examine correlations between both PTROE and GAAP_ETR as well as between 
GAAP_ETR and ROE for firms in industries with high and low industry competition (based on 
CR4 and HHI).   
Implicit tax theory holds that any benefit from lowering explicit taxes is eliminated via a pre-
tax rate of return reduction leading to equal after tax rates of return regardless of explicit taxes paid 
(Scholes et al. 2015).  Thus I expect to find PTROE and GAAP_ETR positively correlated as any 
decrease in GAAP_ETR would be related to a corresponding PTROE decrease for firms in 
industries with high competition and less positive or no correlation for firms in industries with low 
competition.  Further, in a perfectly competitive market, I expect to find no relation between after 
tax return (ROE) and GAAP_ETR as any reductions in GAAP_ETR result in an offsetting pre-tax 
return reduction leading to no effect on after tax return (ROE).  However, a negative relation 
between ROE and GAAP_ETR indicates an ability to retain explicit tax benefits as a reduction in 
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GAAP_ETR results in an increase in after tax return (ROE).  I expect to find a more negative 
relation between GAAP_ETR and ROE for firms in industries with low competition.     
In Table 5, Panel A, I find that there is no significant correlation between PTROE and 
GAAP_ETR for firms in low competition industries (high CR4), and I find that there is a 
significant positive correlation between PTROE and GAAP_ETR for firms in high competition 
industries (low CR4).  And this difference is statistically significant using 2-tailed tests at the 1 
percent or better level.  This suggests that firms in high competition industries have a pre-tax return 
reduction when explicit taxes are lowered.  And for firms in low competition industries, this pre-
tax return disadvantage may not exist.  In other words, firms may be able to lower explicit taxes 
without incurring implicit taxes in the form of lower pre-tax rates of return.  Further, I find a 
negative and significant correlation between ROE and GAAP_ETR for both high competition and 
low competition (CR4) subsamples.  However, I find that the correlation is significantly more 
negative for firms in low competition industries (high CR4).  This suggests that firms in less 
competitive industries can retain benefits from lowering explicit taxes to a greater degree than 
firms in more competitive industries. 
In Table 5, Panel B, I instead use HHI to divide my sample into high low and high competition 
subsamples, and I find consistent results.   
iii. Regressions 
The regressions in Table 6 follow the same theory and logic from my univariate correlation 
tests.  However, in a regression I can examine correlations between GAAP_ETR and PTROE as 
well as GAAP_ETR and ROE conditional on covariates thought to predict variation in the 
GAAP_ETR.  I control for size (LOG_ASSETS), leverage (LEVERAGE), capital intensity (CAP), 
inventory intensity (INV), research and development intensity (RD), and foreign operations 
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(MNE) (Jennings et al. 2012, Chyz et al. 2016b).  Model 1 below corresponds to columns (1) and 
(2) in Table 6 Panel A, and Model 2 below corresponds to results in columns (3) and (4) in Table 
6 Panel B.  For both models (1) and (2), subscripts i, y, and n denote firm, year, and NAICS (2 
digit) industry, respectively.  The high competition variable (HIGH_COMPVAR) is measured by 
the concentration ratio (CR4) in columns (1) and (3) and by HHI in columns (2) and (4) in Table 
6.   
𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 +
𝛽3𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦𝑥𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝐺_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑦 +
𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑦+𝛽8𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑁𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑦 + 𝜀                (1) 
𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 +
𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦𝑥𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝐺_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑦 +
𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑦+𝛽8𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑁𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑦 + 𝜀              (2)  
 
In these regressions, significance of the coefficients on the interaction terms 
PTROExHIGH_COMPVAR and ROExHIGH_COMPVAR (𝛽3) indicates firms in industries with 
high and low competition have different PTROE, GAAP_ETR and ROE, GAAP_ETR relations 
after controlling for size, leverage, capital intensity, inventory intensity, research and development 
intensity, and multinational operations.  If implicit taxes are different between firms operating in 
industries characterized by relatively high or low competition, then I expect to find a negative 
coefficient on the interaction term (PTROExHIGH_COMPVAR) (𝛽3) in model (1) and no 
significance or weaker significance on the joint test for PTROE+PTROExHIGH_COMPVAR 
(𝛽1 + 𝛽3).  No significance on the joint test would suggest that firms in industries with low 
competition (HIGH_COMPVAR=1) get no offsetting pre-tax return reduction from lowering 
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explicit taxes.  A negative coefficient on this interaction would suggest firms in industries with 
less competition (HIGH_COMPVAR=1, low competition) have lower GAAP_ETR, PTROE 
relations than firms in industries with high competition.  As discussed in the correlation tests 
section, implicit tax theory predicts a pre-tax return (PTROE) reduction to offset the benefit from 
lowering explicit taxes (GAAP_ETR).  Thus, a negative coefficient on the interaction term in 
columns (1) and (2) suggests that firms in industries with low competition bear lower implicit 
taxes.   
My results are consistent with my hypothesis that firms in industries with low competition 
bear lower implicit taxes than firms in industries with higher competition.  Specifically, in Table 
6 Panel A, I show that for firms in industries with low competition as measured by HIGH_CR4=1, 
the coefficient on the interaction term (PTROExHIGH_CR4) is -0.0341 (and is significant at the 
5 percent or better level), and for firms in industries with low competition as measured by 
HIGH_HHI=1, the coefficient on the interaction term (PTROExHIGH_HHI) is -0.0339 (and is 
significant at the 5 percent or better level).  This indicates that after controlling for a variety of 
determinants of implicit taxes, firms in industries with lower competition (high CR4 or HHI) have 
lower relations between PTROE and ETR, which suggests lower implicit taxes.9,10,11 Additionally, 
                                                          
9 In a joint test on the coefficients for PTROE, HIGH_COMPVAR, and PTROExHIGH_COMPVAR, I find that the 
relation for the overall sample between PTROE and GAAP_ETR is significantly different than zero at the 1 percent 
or better level. 
10 In a joint test on the coefficients PTROE+PTROExHIGH_COMPVAR, I find no significance. This suggests no 
relation between PTROE and GAAP_ETR for firms in industries with high values of CR4 (HHI), which supports 
the idea that firms in less competitive industries bear lower implicit taxes. 
11 In untabulated tests, I test whether the results here are robust to using firm fixed effects.  The results for this 
regression are not robust to using firm fixed effects.  This may be due to the small number of firm observations.  
2,268 firms in the sample have one observation, 1,304 have two observations, and 1,874 have three observations.  
Firm fixed effects remove the entire effect that the regression is trying to capture for 2,268 firms and potentially a 
large portion of the effect for the remaining firms in the sample.   
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coefficients on control variables are generally consistent with prior literature except for capital 
intensity (CAP) (Jennings et al. 2012, Chyz et al. 2016b).12   
 In model (2) (results shown in Panel B of Table 6), I examine the relation between 
GAAP_ETR and ROE for firms in industries with high and low competition.  As noted previously, 
a finding of no relation between explicit taxes (GAAP_ETR) and after tax return (ROE) would 
suggest implicit taxes are fully offsetting any explicit tax benefit as there is no after-tax return 
(ROE) increase for lowering explicit taxes (GAAP_ETR).  A negative relation between the two 
would suggest firms can keep at least some of the benefit from lowering explicit taxes 
(GAAP_ETR), and the more negative the relation, the more benefit is being retained and thus the 
lower the implicit taxes.   
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 Panel B, I find that the coefficient on the interaction term 
ROExHIGH_CR4 is -0.0794 (and is significant at the 1 percent level or better), and ROExHIGH_ 
HHI is -0.0820 (and is also significant at the 1 percent level or better), which suggests that firms 
in industries with low competition have ROE, GAAP_ETR relations that are further away from 
zero (more negative), which suggests lower implicit taxes for firms in industries with less 
competition. 13,14  I expect similar results regarding the other control variables when ROE is 
substituted for PTROE in columns 3 and 4 from Table 6, which I find.  
  
                                                          
12 In untabulated tests using industry level averages, I find an insignificant correlation between both competition 
measures (CR4 and HHI) and capital intensity (CAP) at the industry level.  This suggests that after controlling for 
industry level competition, capital intensity has a different impact on effective tax rates (GAAP_ETR).  I leave 
exploration of this effect to future research. 
13 In a joint test on the coefficients for ROE, HIGH_COMPAVR and ROExHIGH_COMPVAR, I find that the 
relation for the overall sample between ROE and GAAP_ETR is significantly different than zero at the 1 percent or 
better level. 
14 In a joint test on the coefficients ROE+ROExHIGH_COMPVAR, I find significance at the 1 percent or better 
level.  This suggests that HIGH_COMPVAR industry firms are able to retain the benefits from tax preferences 
through lower implicit taxes.   
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iv. Delta Analysis 
Next, I calculate implicit taxes following an adapted version of the delta analysis methodology 
from Jennings et al. (2012).  Implicit taxes are measured as the reduction in explicit tax preference 
benefits retained by a firm.  This is calculated by setting firm return on equity (ROE) equal to an 
equilibrium ROE, after adjusting each for tax preferences with differences between the two 
attributable to implicit taxes.  I explain this process in more detail in the following paragraphs.     
Tax preferences are any tax reduction mechanism that lowers the explicit taxes and therefore 
mechanically (absent implicit taxes) increases the after-tax return (ROE).  I define tax preferences 
(λ) following Jennings et al. (2012) as the rate required to equalize after tax returns (ROE) between 
a firm and an equilibrium rate of return, absent implicit taxes.  I define firm level after-tax return 
as ROE (= pre-tax income less tax expense scaled by beginning of year shareholder’s equity).  And 
I define equilibrium ROE as ROE*, which is the rate of return all firms earn in the market absent 
tax preferences and implicit taxes.  Thus, 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 = 𝑅𝑂𝐸∗(1 + 𝜆) 
I further extend the model to allow equilibrium wide tax preferences.  I define equilibrium wide 
tax preferences as λ*, such that,  
𝑅𝑂𝐸(1 + 𝜆∗) = 𝑅𝑂𝐸∗(1 + 𝜆) 
However, as discussed previously, implicit taxes reduce the explicit tax benefit retained via a lower 
pre-tax return.  Thus, I extend the model to include implicit taxes (δ), which are defined as the 
reduction in tax preference benefits.  And equilibrium implicit taxes are defined as δ*.  This leads 
to the following model, which considers both implicit taxes and tax preferences, 
𝑅𝑂𝐸(1 + 𝜆∗(1 − δ∗)) = 𝑅𝑂𝐸∗(1 + 𝜆(1 − δ)) 
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The equation above models firm level ROE as equal to equilibrium ROE (ROE*) after adjusting 
for firm level and equilibrium level implicit taxes and tax preferences.  I set equilibrium values 
equal to year averages (changing notation from general equilibrium as indicated by * to year 
average notation) for each group (high and low competition) as this controls for between group 
and year risk differences.  Setting the equilibrium as the year-group average diverges from the 
Jennings et al. 2012 methodology who set the equilibrium at the industry-year average.  I 
alternatively set the equilibrium at an industry-year average as I discuss below.  Solving for ROE 
on the left-hand side results in my main model of interest:  
ROE =
[1 + λ(1 − δ)]
[1 + λy̅(1 − δ𝑦̅̅ ̅)]
ROE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ y + ε  (3) 
In this model, implicit taxes (δ) are the reduction in explicit tax preference benefits eliminated 
through a pre-tax return disadvantage (lower PTROE and thus lower ROE).   
 Implicit tax theory predicts that implicit taxes will eliminate 100 percent of the explicit tax 
preference benefits.  The higher the calculated implicit taxes (δ), the more tax preference benefits 
are eliminated by implicit taxes.  An implicit tax (δ) value of 0 percent would suggest that implicit 
taxes do not eliminate any of the explicit tax preference benefits through a return reduction.  
Because my hypothesis predicts that I will find lower implicit taxes for firms in industries with 
lower competition, realizations of (δ) should decrease with competition. 
Using maximum likelihood estimation, I separately estimate implicit taxes (δ) for firms in 
high competition (low HHI and CR4) and low competition (high HHI and CR4) industries.  Table 
7 shows the results of this estimation using the equilibrium set at the year-group average (where 
group is defined as above or below median competition measures).  In Panel A, I find that for firms 
in less competitive industries (high CR4), implicit taxes eliminate 31.18 percent of the explicit tax 
preference benefits, while for firms in more competitive industries (low CR4), implicit taxes 
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eliminate 62.67 percent of tax preference benefits.  And in Table 7, Panel B, when I measure 
industry competition with HHI, I find similar results.  I find in low competition industries, 28.45 
percent of explicit tax preference benefits are eliminated by implicit taxes, and 62.65 percent of 
explicit tax preference benefits are eliminated by implicit taxes for firms in high competition 
industries.15 
Overall, I find that implicit taxes are higher for firms in industries with greater competition 
and lower for firms in industries with lower competition.  These results are generally consistent 
with prior literature on the product demand side from Chyz, Gaertner, and Laplante (2014) and 
Kubick et al. 2015 who find that firms selling products with more inelastic demand pass on their 
tax avoidance costs less than firms that sell products with more elastic demand and firms with 











                                                          
15 Alternatively, I have calculated delta using the two digit NAICS year averages as the equilibrium.  I do not find 
confirming results with this analysis, which I attribute to this industry year average equilibrium removing the very 
variation among industries I am trying to capture.  
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Section IV: Additional Tests 
a. Sample Restriction Relaxation and Additional Competition Measures 
 In this section, I consider relaxing data cuts and using additional competition measures to 
determine whether my main results are robust to additional model specifications.   
 I first relax the assumption that for a firm to be in a high competition (or low competition) 
industry it must be in an industry with competition above (or below) the median.  I repeat my four 
main tests using quartiles instead of above and below median.  In this set of tests, I start with my 
main sample of firms (n=7,687) and divide the sample into quartiles.  Group (1) includes firms in 
industries with ≥ 75th percentile of CR4 or HHI, Group (2) includes firms in industries with  ≥ 
50th percentile and < 75th percentile of CR4 or HHI, Group (3) includes firms in industries with 
≥ 25th percentile and <50th percentile of CR4 or HHI, and Group (4) includes firms in industries 
with <25th percentile of CR4 or HHI.  The results for this analysis are shown in Tables 8-11.  
Specifically note that each test is reperformed on each quartile sample of firm-years.  Thus, for the 
PTROE/TAX ratio analysis in Table 8, note that the middle 20% of firms are dropped (just like in 
the PTROE/ROE ratio test results shown in Table 4) so that I am comparing the top 40% and the 
bottom 40% of the GAAP ETR distribution for each quartile group, which results in a different 
sample of firms being dropped than in the median cut tests in Table 4.   
Generally I find that my proxies for implicit taxes do not increase monotonically with 
competition.  The mixed results in this section could be attributable noise in terms of differences 
in what competition means across different industries.  It is also possible that the mixed results 
could be due to misclassified industry competition due to the nature of the variable measurement 
– e.g., 4 strong competitors in one industry could provide enough competition for an industry to 
be competitive while thousands of firms in another industry each rest in their own niche and do 
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not directly compete with one another.  Thus, the median tests in the main analysis may have 
smoothed out more misclassification issues than the results in this section. 
 Next I test various additional measures of competition.  I introduce three new categories of 
competition measures in this section including extended Census data from Jan Keil (Keil 2016), 
Gini Coefficient calculations, and Hoberg and Philips’ (Hoberg and Philips 2016, 2010) 
calculations of number of competitors.  The Census data from Keil is compiled by expanding upon 
the electronically available Census data through data requests from the Census.  Keil consolidates 
into a machine-readable fashion Census data from 1987 through 2012.  The Census data is only 
available every 5 years, so this represents data from 6 different years.  I interpret results I find 
using the Keil data with caution; to my knowledge no published paper has used data compiled 
from this secondary source.16   
The Gini Coefficient data is calculated using Compustat data.  The Gini Coefficient was 
developed to measure income inequality (Ceriani and Verme 2012, Gini 1912, and Lorenz 1905).  
The Gini Coefficient is a value between zero and one with lower values representing more equality 
and higher values representing more inequality.  The advantage to using the Gini Coefficient as a 
measure of competition is that it can be calculated for any year using Compustat data.  However, 
I hesitate to interpret results using this measure with caution because the Gini Coefficient is 
calculated excluding private firms as Compustat only includes public firms.  In industries where 
private firms make up a significant portion of sales, the Gini Coefficient calculated may be 
especially noisy and potentially biased.  The Gini Coefficient is generally used as a measure of 
income inequality but has been used to measure distribution of a group to apply to various other 
situations including wastewater allocation (Sun et al. 2010), export growth (Amiti and Freund 




2010), and source code development (Giger et al. 2011) to name a few.  I calculate the Gini 
Coefficient for my Compustat sample of firms using the following model at the industry-year level, 
where industry is defined in multiple ways using two through five digit NAICS and two through 







𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒, 𝑆 = 𝑦1 + ⋯ + 𝑦𝑛+1, 𝑛 =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝑦𝑖 = 100 (
𝑐𝑖
𝑐𝑛+1
) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 + 1, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑖 =
𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠.  17 
The Hoberg and Philips (2010, 2016) data uses textual analysis of the 10-K for each firm 
and based on products mentioned in the 10-K develops a count of the number of other firms with 
similar products mentioned – i.e., number of competitors.18  This data is unique to the other 
competition measures used in this paper as it is the only true firm level measure of competition.  
However, this data still suffers from only being able to capture public firm measures, and the 
measure may be noisy to the extent that this measure does not accurately capture true 
competitors.  Note that this variable increases with the amount of competition and I have 
opposite predictions relative to my other measures of competition. 
I show descriptive statistics for this new data summarized in Table 12.  Notice that the 
alternative competition measures shown in Table 12 have sample sizes (n) that vary and are larger 
in many instances than the sample I use in my main analyses.  The increased sample size is 
potentially a benefit, but the data has limitations as have been previously mentioned. 
                                                          




In Table 13, I show the tax ratio analysis test for implicit taxes using a selection of 
competition measures including the three digit NAICS and SIC level industry for Keil’s CR4.19 
the Gini Coefficient at the three digit NAICS level, and the Hoberg and Philip’s number of 
competitors.  I select each of these to show a variety of different competition measures.  Panels A-
F show the ratios defining high and low tax using a median split on effective tax rates, while Panels 
G-L show the ratios and define high and low tax using the top and bottom 40 percent of the 
effective tax rate distribution.  I then show the results for both a median split and the top and 
bottom quartiles of competition.  The median split splits firms into the Low and High competition 
groups by splitting at the median of competition, and the quartile splits show the highest versus 
lowest quartiles based on competition.  The ratio in the last row of each panel represents the portion 
of explicit tax benefit that is on average eliminated by a pre-tax return on equity disadvantage.  
With the exception of Panels A and G (CR4 at the 3 digit NAICS, SIC using median split), the 
other panels show that firms in industries with higher competition bear higher implicit taxes, 
evidenced by having more of their explicit tax benefits eliminated by a pre-tax return on equity 
disadvantage.   
In Table 14, I show the correlation tests for implicit tax differences.  In this test, a positive 
PTROE, GAAP_ETR correlation represents that as GAAP_ETR decreases, an offsetting PROE 
reduction results, which is evidence of implicit taxes.  A higher positive PTROE, GAAP_ETR 
correlation suggests higher implicit taxes.  For the ROE, GAAP_ETR correlations, a correlation 
of zero suggests that lowering GAAP_ETR has no effect on after tax return (ROE).  A negative 
ROE, GAAP_ETR correlation suggests that as a firm lowers its GAAP_ETR, its ROE increases 
which indicates they may be able to keep the explicit tax benefits.  A correlation close to zero 
                                                          
19 NAICS is used for the Census data from 1997 to the present, and SIC was used prior to 1997. 
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between ROE and GAAP_ETR suggests higher implicit taxes, and a more negative correlation 
suggests lower implicit taxes.  Thus, I expect and find some mixed support for a higher positive 
correlation between PTROE and GAAP_ETR and a more negative correlation between ROE and 
GAAP_ETR for firms in higher competition industries, which suggests higher competition for 
firms in industries with higher competition.  Specifically, I do not find support for implicit taxes 
being higher for firms in industries with high competition when measuring competition using the 
3 digit NAICS and SIC using the CR4 from the Keil data in Table 14, Panels A and B.  I find 
moderate support in the PTROE, GAAP_ETR correlations for competition measured using the 
Gini Coefficients in Table 14, Panels C and D.   And I find moderate support in the PTROE, 
GAAP_ETR correlations for competition measured using the Hoberg and Philips number of 
competitors’ data in Panels E and F.  For the GAAP_ETR, ROE relation, I find mixed results as 
well.  I find support for higher implicit taxes for higher competition industries when competition 
is measured using the Hoberg and Philips number of competitors and when comparing quartiles 
only (Panel F).     
In Table 15, I show regression results for all of the competition variables listed in the 
descriptives in Table 12.  Panels A and B of Table 15 shows the regression results for Models (5) 
and (6), respectively, below: 
𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦𝑥𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝐺_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑦+𝛽8𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑁𝐸𝑖,𝑦 +
∑ 𝛽 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑦 + 𝜀 (5)  
𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦𝑥𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝐺_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑦+𝛽8𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑁𝐸𝑖,𝑦 +
∑ 𝛽 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑦 + 𝜀 (6)  
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Variables are defined in Appendix 1.  These models are similar to models (1) and (2) in the main 
results of this paper with the exception of how COMPVAR is defined.  In these models and the 
results in Table 15, COMPVAR is defined using a continuous competition measure, a median split 
to define high competition (HIGH_50), the top 25 percent of the competition distribution by year 
(High_25), the bottom 25 percent of the competition distribution by year (Low_25), the top 10 
percent of the competition distribution by year (High_10), and the bottom 10 percent of the 
competition distribution by year (Low_10).  Panel A of Table 15 shows the coefficient signs for 
Model (5) and Panel B shows the coefficient signs for Model (6).  The signs in the Table in the  𝛽1 
column show the sign of the coefficient for PTROE in model (5), Panel A and the coefficient for 
ROE in in model (6), Panel B.  The signs are only shown where significant at the 10 percent or 
better level using two tailed tests.  The 𝛽3 columns show the signs for the coefficient on the 
interaction of PTROE and the CompVar in model (5), Panel A and the coefficient on the interaction 
of ROE and the CompVar in model (6), Panel B. The CompVar is defined as a continuous measure 
in the CompVar columns and above or below the 50 percent, 25 percent, or 10 percent as indicated 
in the other columns.  The Competition Variable (CompVar) is defined in the leftmost column in 
the Table.  In Panel A of Table 15, a positive 𝛽1 coefficient indicates a positive relation between 
PTROE and GAAP_ETR, while a negative (positive) 𝛽3 indicates a lower (higher) relation 
between PTROE and GAAP_ETR.  A positive relation between PTROE and GAAP_ETR suggests 
the presence of implicit taxes following the same theory in the correlations section that a positive 
relation suggests that as a firm lowers its explicit taxes and GAAP_ETR declines, an offsetting 
return via lower PTROE results.  Thus, the more positive the relation the higher the implicit taxes 
that are suggested.  Specifically, in the CompVar column, a negative 𝛽3 indicates that as the 
competition variable increases the relation between PTROE and GAAP_ETR declines, and vice 
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versa.  For all competition variables with the exception of HP_COMP, as the variable increases, 
competition decreases and vice versa.  For the HP_COMP variable, as this value increases, the 
number of competitors increases which increases the level of competition.  Thus, for the 
continuous measure of competition variables, I find support for a lower PTROE, GAAP ETR 
relation (lower implicit taxes) for firms as competition decreases using a continuous measure of 
competition when competition is measured using a variety of competition measures including 
many Keil Census measures (Keil_CR4_2, Keil_CR8_2, Keil_CR4_3, Keil_CR8_3, Keil_CR4_4, 
Keil_CR8_4, Keil_CR4_5, Keil_CR8_5), Gini Coefficient measures (GC_NAICS_2, 
GC_NAICS_3, GC_SIC_3, GC_SIC_4, GC_NAICS_5), and the Hoberg and Philips measure 
(HP_COMP).  In the other columns, I look at whether this continuous relation I find in the first 
two columns is driven by the extreme quartiles and deciles.  The mixed results I find in the other 
columns suggest that the linear relation I find in the first two columns may be driven by a linear 
relation that exists despite anomalies in the ends of the distribution.   
 In Panel B, of Table 15, I show the signs of the correlation coefficients for model (6) using 
the same set up and competition variable definitions as in Panel A.  Following the correlation tests 
theory, a negative relation between GAAP_ETR and ROE suggests firms are able to retain explicit 
tax savings that are not offset by implicit taxes, and thus a closer to zero relation indicates higher 
implicit taxes.  I find very little support for implicit taxes varying with competition in Panel B for 
the alternate competition measures.   
 Table 16 shows the estimation of implicit taxes using Model (3) delta analysis.  The delta 
in these Tables is the measure of implicit taxes, where implicit taxes are measured as the 
percentage of explicit tax savings (tax preference benefits) offset by implicit taxes, and thus higher 
values indicate higher implicit taxes.  I show the results using median and quartile cuts for three 
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measures of competition including: Keil’s CR4 at the three digit NAICS and SIC, the Gini 
Coefficient at the three digit NAICS, and Hoberg and Philips’ number of competitors.  In this 
analysis using median cuts (Panels A, C, and E), I only find support for higher competition firms 
having higher implicit taxes when competition is measured using CR4 at the three digit NAICS 
and SIC in Panel A.  Further, I do not find support for a monotonic increase in implicit taxes as 
the quartile of competition increases in Panels B, D, and F.   
b. Industry Level Tests 
As competition in my main set of tests is measured at the industry level, I consider whether 
measuring and examining the existence of implicit taxes at the industry-year level as opposed to 
the firm-year level impacts the results.  In untabulated tests, I find that my main results are 
generally supported when implicit taxes are examined at the industry level.  All details except for 
those specifically mentioned are identical to the main set of comparable tests (i.e., Tables 4-6).  
For the PTROE/TAX ratio analysis (similar to Table 4), I find that when competition is measured 
using CR4 for the same sample as my main analysis, implicit taxes offset 79.95 percent of the 
explicit tax advantage for high competition (low CR4) industries and only 6.30 percent of the 
explicit tax advantage for low competition (high CR4) firms.  In the correlation tests at the industry 
level (similar to Table 5), I find that for industries considered low competition (high CR4), the 
PTROE, GAAP_ETR correlation is 15.04 percent and 7.98 percent for high competition (low 
CR4) industries, however, the difference is not statistically different, which is likely driven by the 
low sample size when using industry-year level measures. And finally, for the regression tests at 
the industry-year level (comparable to Table 6, Panel A), and using model (1) at the industry-year 
level, I find that the coefficient on the interaction of PTROExHIGH_CR4 (low competition) is 
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positive and not statistically significant.  The nonexistent results for the regression results here are 
likely driven once again by the low sample size in this analysis (n=62 here).   
 The weakness of my results in these other models suggests that the degree that competition 
impacts implicit taxes relies on how competition is measured.  Further, my weak results in these 
sections may be evidence that the United States has done a good job of preventing monopolies and 
price fixing, and the weak and nonexistent results shown in this section may be due to all or most 



















Section V:  Conclusion  
In summary, I find that implicit taxes are higher and eliminate more of the explicit tax 
preference benefits when markets are more competitive as proxied for by market concentration 
ratios and the HHI in my main analysis.  That is, when more monopolistic or oligopolistic powers 
are present and a few firms can control the market, then implicit taxes are lower and firms are able 
to retain more tax preference benefits.   
Using four sets of tests, implicit taxes appear to be lower for firms and industries facing lower 
competition and vice versa.  My results should be of interest to policy makers as tax preferences 
allowed in the tax code are meant to promote certain activities.  If implicit taxes arise on these tax 
preferences, this indicates increased investment in these areas, which is the goal of the policy.  If 
implicit taxes arise and fully offset the tax preference benefits, then the benefits of the tax 
preference may have accrued to the group benefited by the over-investment.  However, if implicit 
taxes do not fully offset the explicit tax preference benefits, then the benefits of the tax preference 
are accruing to the shareholders of the firm, which is likely not the goal of the tax preference 
allowed for by Congress.  My results should interest firm decision makers as implicit taxes should 
be taken into account when making tax related decisions as lowering the explicit tax rate at the 
expense of lowering ROE (via implicit taxes) may result when implicit taxes are borne.  However, 
from the firm’s perspective, in industries with less competition, investing in tax preference benefits 
may be extremely beneficial as implicit taxes are lower than in less competitive industries, and 
more benefit from investing in tax preferences may be retained by the firm.  Further, my results 
should be of interest to researchers as most explicit tax research does not consider implicit taxes 
and as such, my findings that implicit taxes may vary predictably based on market factors could 
alter prior explicit tax findings.  Finally, my results should be of interest to the general public who 
34 
 
may be concerned about firms not paying their share of taxes.  If firms are paying lower explicit 
taxes but bearing high implicit taxes and potentially benefitting the public (e.g., through increased 
R&D) then the public should be unconcerned.  However, for firms in less competitive markets 
(i.e., firms in more monopolistic type markets), the public’s concern about firms not paying their 
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APPENDIX 1: Variable Definitions 
 
  
GAAP_ETRi,y = tax expense/pretax income (txt/pi) 
PTROEi,y = pretax income/beginning of year shareholders' equity 
ROEi,y = after tax income/beg of year shareholders' equity = (pretax income - tax 
expense)/beginning of year shareholders' equity 
Total Assetsi,y = total assets (at) 
Keil_CRX_Y =Concentration Ratio of top X=4 or 8 firms for each industry (as defined by 
2,3,4,or 5 digit NAICS or SIC).  Note that NAICS is used for 1997-2015, and SIC 
is used for 1980-1996 in this sample.  And SIC has a maximum of 5 digits.  Data is 
provided by Jan Keil: https://sites.google.com/site/drjankeil/data 
Keil_HHI_Y =Herfindahl index for each industry (as defined by 2,3,4,or 5 digit NAICS or SIC).  
Note that NAICS is used for 1997-2015, and SIC is used for 1980-1996 in this 
sample.  And SIC has a maximum of 5 digits.  Note that data is not provided for 
HHI for 2 digit NAICS and SIC.  Data is provided by Jan Keil: 
https://sites.google.com/site/drjankeil/data 
GC_Z_Y =Gini Coefficient measured using Z=SIC or NAICS, at the Y=2,3,4,or 5 digit 
level.  The Gini Coefficient (GC) measures inequality, and is calculated as follows: 
GC=(100+(100-2S)/n)/100, where n=number of firms, S=sum of yi, 
yi=100(ci/cn+1), ci=cumulative revenue (revt) totals after being sorted within each 
industry by revenue.  (defined http://peterrosenmai.com/lorenz-curve-graphing-
tool-and-gini-coefficient-calculator) 
HP_COMP = number of competitors as defined by Hoberg and Philips.  Data is provided by 
Hoberg and Philips at: http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/ 
CR4n,y = top 4 firms' concentration ratio = total revenue (revt) of top 4 firms by NAICS 2 
digit year / total sales for industry (Census) 
HHIn,y =sum of market share squared by NAICS 2 digit year, where market share=total 








Figure 1: This figure shows the effect on price of an increase in demand in a perfectly competitive market. 
 
 





Figure 3: This figure shows the effect on price of a shift in the marginal cost in a monopoly.  In a 
monopoly, the single firm produces at the point at which marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost 
(MC). 
 
Figure 4: This figure shows the effect on price of a shift in the supply curve when the supplier operates as 






Figure 5: This figure shows the effect on price of a shift in the demand curve when the supplier operates 





TABLE 1: EFFECT OF SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURES ON SAMPLE SIZE 
 
  PROCEDURE    SAMPLE    
1 All U.S. firm-years from 2002, 2007, and 2012 Compustat with non-
missing financial statement information 
 
       13,620  
 
2 Delete firms where ROE is greater than 1 
 
          (457) 
 
3 Delete firms where ROE is negative 
 
        (3,717) 
 
4 Delete if tax expense (txt) is negative 
 
          (898) 
 
5 Delete if pretax income is negative 
 
          (494) 
 
6 Delete if negative stockholders' equity (at-lt) 
 
            (44) 
 
7 Delete if total assets (at) < $10 million 
 
          (151) 
 
8 Delete if Pretax book income (pi-spi) < $500,000 
 
            (97) 
 
9 Delete if Census Industry Sales data unavailable or 0 
 




         7,687  
 










33 Manufacturing (e.g., metal, agricultural) 0.0074        0.1128   1,626     
52 Finance & insurance 0.0003        0.0242   1,524     
32 Manufacturing (e.g., wood, plastics, rubber) 0.0175        0.2000   657        
22 Utilities 0.0008        0.0271   599        
51 Information 0.0009        0.0503   525        
31 Manufacturing 0.0073        0.1045   371        
42 Wholesale trade 0.0000        0.0043   313        
54 Professional, scientific, & technical services 0.0001        0.0119   301        
44 Retail Trade 0.0002        0.0213   294        
21 Mining, Quarrying, & Oil & Gas Extraction 0.0024        0.0709   272        
48 Transportation & Warehousing 0.0004        0.0273   204        
56
Administrative & support & waste management & 
remediation services 0.0001        0.0142   173        
72 Accommodation & food services 0.0001        0.0182   172        
62 Health care & social assistance 0.0000        0.0034   157        
45 Retail Trade 0.0061        0.1098   155        
53 Real estate & rental & leasing 0.0000        0.0109   151        
23 Construction 0.0001        0.0120   51         
71 Arts, entertainment, & recreation 0.0000        0.0032   51         
61 Educational services 0.0001        0.0120   32         
49 Transportation & Warehousing 0.0289        0.3058   31         
81 Other services (except public administration) 0.0000        0.0018   28         
7,687     
TABLE 2: SAMPLE COMPOSITION BY GENERAL INDUSTRY CATEOGRY
This table shows the sample composition by 2 digit NAICS.  HHI and CR4 are shown as averages of 














GAAP_ETRi,y 0.3210    0.1114          0.3455    0.2796   0.3812    
ROEi,y 0.1556    0.1255          0.1241    0.0769   0.1920    
PTROEi,y 0.2312    0.1842          0.1843    0.1122   0.2889    
CR4n,y 0.0553    0.0825          0.0191    0.0093   0.0585    
HHIn,y 0.0035    0.0082          0.0001    0.0000   0.0012    
Total Assetsn,y 5,676.14  16,559.37      876.27    253.09   3,226.91  
LEVERAGEn,y 0.20        0.18              0.17        0.04       0.32        
CAPn,y 0.25        0.26              0.16        0.04       0.40        
INVn,y 0.10        0.13              0.03        0.00       0.15        
RDn,y 0.02        0.05              -         -        0.01        
MNEn,y 0.44        0.50              -         -        1.00        









GAAP_ETRi,y 0.3241    0.1072          0.3509    0.2842   0.3840    
ROEi,y 0.1489    0.1259          0.1170    0.0743   0.1770    
PTROEi,y 0.2234    0.1870          0.1745    0.1079   0.2709    
CR4n,y 0.0132    0.0092          0.0133    0.0039   0.0188    
HHIn,y 0.0001    0.0002          0.0001    0.0000   0.0001    
Total Assetsn,y 6,369.08  18,405.05      1,009.79  352.90   3,506.74  
LEVERAGEn,y 0.21        0.19              0.17        0.05       0.33        
CAPn,y 0.23        0.27              0.08        0.02       0.39        
INVn,y 0.07        0.13              0.01        -        0.05        
RDn,y 0.00        0.02              -         -        -         
MNEn,y 0.27        0.44              -         -        1.00        













GAAP_ETRi,y 0.3178    0.1155       0.3396   0.2714   0.3788    
ROEi,y 0.1625    0.1248       0.1331   0.0797   0.2079    
PTROEi,y 0.2393    0.1810       0.1952   0.1179   0.3059    
CR4n,y 0.1317    0.1006       0.1029   0.0528   0.2064    
HHIn,y 0.0097    0.0116       0.0040   0.0010   0.0187    
Total Assetsn,y 4,965.86  14,392.33   720.98   186.21   2,898.84  
LEVERAGEn,y 0.20        0.17           0.18       0.03       0.32        
CAPn,y 0.28        0.23           0.21       0.10       0.40        
INVn,y 0.12        0.12           0.10       0.02       0.18        
RDn,y 0.04        0.06           0.01       -        0.05        
MNEn,y 0.61        0.49           1.00       -        1.00        
This table provides descriptive statistics by firm-year except for CR4 and HHI.  
CR4 and HHI use values for the 21 industries in the sample.  Subscripts i, y, and 
n represent firm level, year level, and NAICS (2 digit) industry level 
respectively.  Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for all firm-years, Panel B 
shows the descriptive statistics for firm-years where HIGH_CR4=0, and Panel 
C shows the descriptive statistics for firm-years where HIGH_CR4=1.  
PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS, LEVERAGE, CAP, 







 Low Competition 
(High CR4)  
 High Competition 
(Low CR4) 
 (n=3,037)  (n=3,112)  Difference 
HIGH-TAX (n=3,078)
     PTROE Average 0.2416                    0.2595                (0.0179)        **
     TAX Average 0.0927                    0.0991                (0.0064)        **
(n=1,520) (n=1,558)
LOW-TAX (n=3,071)
     PTROE Average 0.2212                    0.1866                0.0346         ***
     TAX Average 0.0472                    0.0429                0.0043         **
(n=1,517) (n=1,554)
Difference
     PTROE 0.0204                    *** 0.0729                ***
     TAX 0.0455                    *** 0.0562                ***
RATIO (PTROE/TAX) 0.4484                    1.2976                
 Low Competition 
(High HHI) 
 High Competition 
(Low HHI) 
 (n=3,049)  (n=3,098) Difference
HIGH-TAX (n=3,077)
     PTROE 0.2350                    0.2632                (0.0283)        ***
     TAX 0.0901                    0.1007                (0.0106)        ***
(n=1,526) (n=1,551)
LOW-TAX (n=3,070)
     PTROE 0.2200                    0.1891                0.0309         ***
     TAX 0.0465                    0.0438                0.0027         
(n=1,523) (n=1,547)
Difference
     PTROE 0.0150                    ** 0.0741                ***
     TAX 0.0436                    *** 0.0569                ***
RATIO (PTROE/TAX) 0.3444                    1.3030                
TABLE 4: PTROE/TAX RATIOS
Panel A: High v. Low CR4




TABLE 4 Continued 
This table summarizes the ratios (PTROE/TAX) by above (≥) and below median (<) concentration 
ratios (CR4) and Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI).  HIGH-TAX firms have GAAP_ETRs in the top 
40% of the distribution, while LOW-TAX firms have GAAP_ETRs in the bottom 40% of the 
distribution.  *, **, and*** indicate significance at the better than 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, using 2-tailed tests.  Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, and NAICS (2 
digit) industry level respectively.  PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS, LEVERAGE, 
CAP, INV, and RD are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  See the Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
                 
Difference =high tax PTROE(TAX) - low tax PTROE(TAX) 
 
High CR4n,y =1 for firms with ≥median CR4n,y by industry/year 
 
High HHIn,y =1 for firms with ≥median HHIn,y by industry/year 
 
Low CR4n,y =1 for firms with <median CR4n,y by industry/year 
 
Low HHIn,y =1 for firms with <median HHIn,y by industry/year 
 
PTROEi,y = pretax income/beginning of year shareholders' equity 
 
TAXi,y = reduction to ROE caused by explicit taxes = tax expense/beginning of 
year shareholders' equity 





TABLE 5: CORRELATIONS 
 
Panel A: High v. Low CR4   
  
Low Competition  
(HIGH CR4)  
High Competition  
(LOW CR4)     
  (n=3,796)   (n=3,891)   Difference    
PTROEi,y,GAAP_ETRi,y                   0.0245                      0.1063  
 
***  
       
(0.0819) 
 
***   
ROEi,y,GAAP_ETRi,y 
                   
(0.1551) ***  
                  
(0.0509) ***  
       
(0.1042) 
 
***   
                  
         
Panel B: High v. Low 
HHI        
  
Low Competition  
(HIGH HHI)  
High Competition  
(LOW HHI)     
  (n=3,813)   (n=3,874)   Difference    
PTROEi,y,GAAP_ETRi,y                   0.0223                      0.1055  
 
***  
       
(0.0832) 
 
***   
ROEi,y,GAAP_ETRi,y 
                 
(0.1569) ***  
                  
(0.0522) ***  
       
(0.1047) 
 
***   
                  
         
Table 5 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between PTROE and GAAP_ETR as well as for 
ROE and GAAP_ETR for firms in industries with low and high competition.  *, **, and*** indicate 
significance at the at least 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using 2-tailed tests.  Tests of 
differences are calculated using z-statistics.  Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, and 
NAICS (2 digit) industry level respectively.  PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, and ROE are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99%  See the Appendix 1 for variable definitions.   
         
High CR4n,y =1 for firms with ≥median CR4n,y by industry/year  
High HHIn,y 
=1 for firms with ≥median HHIn,y by industry/year  
Low CR4n,y =1 for firms with <median CR4n,y by industry/year  
Low HHIn,y =1 for firms with <median HHIn,y by industry/year 

































PTROE+PTROExHIGH_COMP_VAR Not Sig. Not Sig.
Year FE? Yes Yes
Observations 7,687 7,687
R-squared 0.036 0.036
































Year FE? Yes Yes
Observations 7,687 7,687
R-squared 0.048 0.048




TABLE 6 Continued 
Table 6 shows the coefficient estimates from a regression of GAAP_ETR on the independent 
variables listed.  Panel A, Columns (1) and (2) use model (1), and columns (3) and (4) use 
model (2).  Year fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered by firm.  Robust t-
statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively, using 2-sided tests.  Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, 
and NAICS (2 digit) industry level respectively.  PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, 
TOTAL_ASSETS, LEVERAGE, CAP, INV, and RD are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  See the 
Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
    
        
COMP_VARn,y =CR4n,y or HHIn,y 
High CR4n,y =1 for firms with ≥median CR4n,y 
by industry/year 
High HHIn,y =1 for firms with ≥median HHIn,y 
by industry/year 
HIGH_COMP_VARn,y =HIGH CR4n,y or HIGH HHIn,y 





PANEL A: HIGH v. LOW CR4
Delta Variance of Delta n
0.3118   0.0151   3,796     
0.6267   0.0156   3,891     
PANEL B: HIGH v. LOW HHI
Delta Variance of Delta n
0.2845   0.0146   3,813     





Using Maximum Likelihood Estimation, Table 7 directly estimates the magnitude of implicit taxes 
for each group (above and below median CR4) by calculating delta (δ) using model (3) as shown 
below. Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, and NAICS (2 digit) industry level 
respectively.  PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS, LEVERAGE, CAP, INV, 
and RD are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  See the appendix for variable definitions.  Panels A and B 
set equilibrium values as the group (above or below median competition measures) year averages.
=group average δ
=error term
=tax preferences = (T*-GAAP_ETR)/(1-T*)
=group average λ
HIGH  CR4n,y (HHIn,y )
LOW  CR4n,y (HHIn,y ) =1 for firms with <median HHIn,y  (CR4n,y )by industry/year
=group average ROE.
=equilibrium tax rate = year average
=implicit tax measure as calculated by model (3)
=1 for firms with ≥median CR4n,y (HHIn,y )by industry/year
High Competition 


















     PTROE Average 0.2612                        0.2444    0.2156    0.2509                
     TAX Average 0.1019                        0.0919    0.0858    0.0946                
(n=746) (n=566) (n=290) (n=1074)
LOW-TAX 
     PTROE Average 0.2335                        0.1810    0.2246    0.2265                
     TAX Average 0.0584                        0.0435    0.0508    0.0466                
(n=749) (n=568) (n=293) (n=1077)
Difference
     PTROE 0.0277                        *** 0.0634    *** (0.0090)   0.0244                ***
     TAX 0.0434                        *** 0.0483    *** 0.0349    *** 0.0481                ***
RATIO (PTROE/TAX) 0.6384                        1.3114    (0.2576)   0.5078                
 (1) Lowest 25% 
Competition 









     PTROE Average 0.2725                        0.2271    0.2190    0.2444                
     TAX Average 0.1057                        0.0848    0.0848    0.0928                
(n=732) (n=734) (n=291) (n=1117)
LOW-TAX 
     PTROE Average 0.2421                        0.1602    0.2257    0.2211                
     TAX Average 0.0612                        0.0347    0.0507    0.0464                
(n=735) (n=736) (n=293) (n=1119)
Difference
     PTROE 0.0304                        *** 0.0670    *** (0.0068)   0.0233                ***
     TAX 0.0444                        *** 0.0501    *** 0.0341    *** 0.0463                ***
RATIO (PTROE/TAX) 0.6837                        1.3372    (0.1987)   0.5036                
TABLE 8: PTROE/TAX RATIOS  (Quartiles)
Panel A: Competion by CR4




TABLE 8 Continued 
This table summarizes the ratios (PTROE/TAX) by above (≥) and below median (<) concentration 
ratios (CR4) and Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI).  HIGH-TAX firms have GAAP_ETRs in the 
top 40% of the distribution, while LOW-TAX firms have GAAP_ETRs in the bottom 40% of the 
distribution.  *, **, and*** indicate significance at the better than 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, using 2-tailed tests.  Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, and NAICS (2 
digit) industry level respectively.  PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS, 
LEVERAGE, CAP, INV, and RD are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  See the Appendix 1 for variable 
definitions. 






























TAXi,y = reduction to ROE caused by explicit taxes = tax 








 (1) Lowest 
25% 
Competition 









PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y 0.0321             * 0.0093    0.1559    *** 0.0274            
ROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y (0.1420)            *** (0.1911)   *** 0.0028    (0.1323)          ***
 (1) Lowest 
25% 
Competition 









PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y 0.0315             * 0.0166    0.1468    *** 0.0370            
ROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y (0.1424)            *** (0.1625)   *** (0.0104)   (0.1233)          ***
Difference
TAXi,y = reduction to ROE caused by explicit taxes = tax expense/beginning of year 
shareholders' equity
TABLE 9: CORRELATIONS (Quartiles)
Panel A: High v. Low CR4
Panel B: Competition by HHI
This table summarizes the ratios (PTROE/TAX) by  quartile of the concentration ratios (CR4) and Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI).  Group (1) includes firms in industries with ≥ 75th percentile of CR4 or HHI, Group (2) 
includes firms in industries with  ≥ 50th percentile and < 75th percentile of CR4 or HHI, Group (3) includes 
firms in industries with ≥ 25th percentile and <50th percentile of CR4 or HHI, and Group (4) includes firms in 
industries with <25th percentile of CR4 or HHI.  HIGH-TAX firms have GAAP_ETRs in the top 40% of the 
distribution, while LOW-TAX firms have GAAP_ETRs in the bottom 40% of the distribution.  *,**,and*** 
indicate significance at the better than 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using 2-tailed tests.  Subscripts i, 
y, and n represent firm level, year level, and NAICS (2 digit) industry level respectively.  PTROE, TAX, 
GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS, LEVERAGE, CAP, INV, and RD are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
Variables are defined in Appendix 1.




(1) (2) (3) (4)










Constant 0.338*** 0.358*** 0.339*** 0.359***





HIGH_COMP_VAR -0.00735 -0.00634 -0.0112** -0.00973*





LOG_ASSETS -0.00189** -0.00196** -0.00209** -0.00214**
(-2.179) (-2.283) (-2.392) (-2.471)
LEVERAGE -0.0147 -0.00571 -0.0148 -0.00584
(-1.435) (-0.555) (-1.445) (-0.568)
CAP 0.0234*** 0.0208*** 0.0219*** 0.0192***
(3.537) (3.131) (3.373) (2.954)
INV 0.0454*** 0.0520*** 0.0504*** 0.0560***
(3.830) (4.435) (4.212) (4.733)
RD -0.241*** -0.258*** -0.233*** -0.253***
(-5.860) (-6.413) (-5.715) (-6.332)
MNE 0.00873*** 0.0140*** 0.0104*** 0.0154***
(2.690) (4.285) (3.132) (4.595)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,687 7,687 7,687 7,687
R-squared 0.037 0.047 0.038 0.048






TABLE 10 Continued 
 
High CR4n,y =1 for firms with ≥75th percentile CR4n,y by industry/year 
High HHIn,y =1 for firms with ≥75th percentile HHIn,y by industry/year 
HIGH_COMP_VARn,y =HIGH CR4n,y or HIGH HHIn,y 
This table summarizes the regression results for model (1) in Columns (1) and (2), and model (2) in columns 
(3) and (4).   Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *, **, and*** indicate significance at the better than 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively, using 2-tailed tests.  Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, and 
NAICS (2 digit) industry level respectively.  PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS, 





TABLE 11: DIRECT ESTIMATION OF IMPLICIT TAXES (Quartiles) 
 
PANEL A: HIGH v. LOW CR4      




CR4)                    0.3727                      0.0159               2,689   
(2)                    0.2067                      0.0150                 729   




CR4)                    0.2202                      0.0175               1,867   
                  
         
PANEL B: HIGH v. LOW HHI      




HHI)                    0.3961                      0.0148               2,794   
(2)                    0.3111                      0.0149                 730   




HHI)                    0.2674                      0.0191               1,833   
                  
         
Using Maximum Likelihood Estimation, Table 11 directly estimates the magnitude of implicit taxes for 
each group (above and below median CR4) by calculating delta (δ) using model (3) as shown below. 
Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, and NAICS (2 digit) industry level respectively.  
PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS, LEVERAGE, CAP, INV, and RD are 
winsorized at 1% and 99%.  Groups (1)-(4) are formed based on CR4 or HHI quartiles by year with (1) 
representing the highest quartile CR4 and HHI, and (4) representing the lowest CR4 and HHI.  Group 
(1) includes firms in industries with ≥ 75th percentile of CR4 or HHI, Group (2) includes firms in 
industries with  ≥ 50th percentile and < 75th percentile of CR4 or HHI, Group (3) includes firms in 
industries with ≥ 25th percentile and <50th percentile of CR4 or HHI, and Group (4) includes firms in 










=industry average λ, where λ is calculated for each FF48 industry, and then 
=Industry average ROE.
=equilibrium tax rate = year average
=implicit tax measure as calculated by model (3)
=industry average δ
=error term





n  Mean  Standard Deviation  Median   25th Percentile  75th Percentile 
GAAP_ETRi,y 133,290  0.33        0.28                      0.36       0.27                0.40                 
ROEi,y 133,290  0.17        0.14                      0.13       0.08                0.20                 
PTROEi,y 133,290  0.25        0.22                      0.20       0.12                0.31                 
Total Assetsn,y 133,290  5,034.12  41,480.39              337.41   64.57              1,635.02           
LEVERAGEn,y 133,281  0.22        0.19                      0.20       0.05                0.35                 
CAPn,y 129,669  0.28        0.26                      0.20       0.05                0.44                 
INVn,y 130,437  0.12        0.15                      0.05       0.00                0.20                 
RDn,y 132,948  0.02        0.11                      -        -                 0.01                 
MNEn,y 133,290  0.30        0.46                      -        -                 1.00                 
Keil_CR4_2 22,615    7.17        4.35                      6.20       4.20                7.40                 
Keil_CR8_2 22,615    11.37      6.54                      9.90       6.80                11.80               
Keil_CR4_3 22,840    13.07      11.00                    8.90       6.30                18.00               
Keil_CR8_3 22,840    19.22      14.33                    14.70     9.90                26.20               
Keil_HHI_3 4,620     0.01        0.02                      0.01       0.01                0.01                 
Keil_CR4_4 22,931    26.80      14.36                    20.80     18.10              38.80               
Keil_CR8_4 22,931    34.94      16.30                    31.60     23.80              48.10               
Keil_HHI_4 4,784     0.03        0.03                      0.03       0.01                0.05                 
Keil_CR4_5 15,164    28.26      14.34                    25.60     17.70              34.30               
Keil_CR8_5 15,163    38.49      16.97                    35.80     26.40              47.90               
Keil_HHI_5 4,768     0.05        0.04                      0.04       0.02                0.06                 
GC_NAICS_2 131,598  0.85        0.08                      0.89       0.81                0.90                 
GC_NAICS_3 131,512  0.80        0.11                      0.82       0.73                0.90                 
GC_NAICS_4 130,160  0.76        0.14                      0.77       0.67                0.88                 
GC_SIC_2 133,290  0.81        0.10                      0.84       0.74                0.90                 
GC_SIC_3 133,290  0.76        0.14                      0.77       0.67                0.87                 
GC_SIC_4 133,288  0.72        0.15                      0.73       0.62                0.83                 
GC_NAICS_5 124,770  0.72        0.18                      0.74       0.62                0.86                 
HP_COMP 59,348    146.42    204.67                  54.00     16.00              165.00             
TABLE 12: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (Additional Competition Measures)
Table 12 provides descriptive statistics by firm-year See Appendix 1 for variable definitions.  This data 
includes firm-year data for years 1980-2015 with data requirements (1)-(7) from Table (1) applied 
excluding the 2002, 2007, and 2012 fiscal year requirement.  Each competition variable (all variables listed 





 Low Competition 
(High CR4)  
 High Competition 
(Low CR4) 
 Difference 
HIGH-TAX  (Top 50%)
     PTROE Average 0.2839                0.2778               0.0061       
     TAX Average 0.1164                0.1071               0.0093       ***
(n=8005) (n=3418)
LOW-TAX (Bottom 50%)
     PTROE Average 0.2185                0.2294               (0.0109)      
     TAX Average 0.0541                0.0539               0.0002       
(n=8002) (n=3415)
Difference
     PTROE 0.0654                *** 0.0484               ***
     TAX 0.0623                *** 0.0532               ***
RATIO (PTROE/TAX) 1.0492                0.9097               
 Low Competition 
(High CR4) 
 High Competition 
(Low CR4) 
 Difference 
HIGH-TAX  (Top 50%)
     PTROE Average 0.2916                0.2992               (0.0076)      
     TAX Average 0.1217                0.1156               0.0061       **
(n=6313) (n=1388)
LOW-TAX (Bottom 50%)
     PTROE Average 0.2218                0.2190               0.0029       
     TAX Average 0.0564                0.0495               0.0069       ***
(n=6309) (n=1386)
Difference
     PTROE 0.0698                *** 0.0803               ***
     TAX 0.0653                *** 0.0661               ***
RATIO (PTROE/TAX) 1.0683                1.2150               
TABLE 13: PTROE/TAX RATIOS (Additional Competition Measures)
Panel A: High v. Low CR4 (NAICS 3 and SIC 3) (median split)
Panel B: High v. Low CR4 (NAICS 3 and SIC 3) (Quartiles)
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 Low Competition 
(High GC)  




     PTROE Average 0.2903               0.2839                0.0063      ***
     TAX Average 0.1173               0.1158                0.0015      **
(n=33512) (n=32266)
LOW-TAX (Bottom 50%)
     PTROE Average 0.2221               0.2155                0.0066      ***
     TAX Average 0.0526               0.0533                (0.0007)     
(n=33490) (n= 32244)
Difference
     PTROE 0.0682               *** 0.0684                ***
     TAX 0.0647               *** 0.0625                ***
RATIO (PTROE/TAX) 1.0538               1.0944                
 Low Competition 
(High GC) 
 High Competition 
(Low GC) 
 Difference 
HIGH-TAX  (Top 50%)
     PTROE Average 0.2799               0.2783                0.0016      
     TAX Average 0.1124               0.1139                (0.0015)     
(n=18835) (n=15809)
LOW-TAX (Bottom 50%)
     PTROE Average 0.2111               0.2025                0.0085      ***
     TAX Average 0.0509               0.0525                (0.0017)     
(n=18811) (n=15790)
Difference
     PTROE Average 0.0688               *** 0.0758                ***
     TAX 0.0616               *** 0.0614                ***
RATIO (PTROE/TAX) 1.1183               1.2340                
Panel C: High v. Low Gini Coefficient (GC) (NAICS 3) (median split)






 Low Competition 
(Low Number of 
Competitors) 
 High Competition 




     PTROE Average 0.2749                    0.2475               0.0274       
     TAX Average 0.1063                    0.0645               0.0418       
(n=14773) (n=14912)
LOW-TAX (Bottom 50%)
     PTROE Average 0.2504                    0.1844               0.0660       
     TAX Average 0.0646                    0.0368               0.0278       
(n=14760) (n=14903)
Difference
     PTROE 0.0245                    *** 0.0631               ***
     TAX 0.0417                    *** 0.0277               ***
RATIO (PTROE/TAX) 0.5884                    2.2806               
 Low Competition 
(Low Number of 
Competitors) 
 High Competition 




     PTROE Average 0.2729                    0.2166               0.0563       
     TAX Average 0.1055                    0.0791               0.0264       
(n=7231) (n=7438)
LOW-TAX (Bottom 50%)
     PTROE Average 0.2549                    0.1760               0.0789       
     TAX Average 0.0676                    0.0370               0.0307       
(n=7221) (n=7427)
Difference
     PTROE 0.0180                    *** 0.0406               ***
     TAX 0.0379                    *** 0.0421               ***
RATIO (PTROE/TAX) 0.4761                    0.9649               
Panel E: High v. Low Number of Competitors (Hoberg and Philips) (median split)








TABLE 13 Continued 
Panel G: High v. Low CR4 (NAICS 3 and SIC 3) (median split) 
  
 Low Competition 
(High CR4)    
 High Competition 
(Low CR4)     
           Difference    
        
HIGH-TAX  
(Top 40%)       
     PTROE Average                    0.2865                         0.2800          0.0065   
     TAX Average                    0.1201                         0.1098          0.0103  *** 
   (n=6405)    (n=2734)     
LOW-TAX  
(Bottom 40%)       
     PTROE Average                    0.2083                         0.2175        (0.0092)  
     TAX Average                    0.0450                         0.0443          0.0007   
   (n=6401)    (n=2732)     
Difference       
     PTROE                    0.0782  
 
***                        0.0625  ***   
     TAX                    0.0751  
 
***                        0.0655  ***   
RATIO 
(PTROE/TAX)                    1.0406                         0.9532     
                
        
Panel H: High v. Low CR4 (NAICS 3 and SIC 3) (Quartiles) 
  
 Low Competition 
(High CR4)   
 High Competition 
(Low CR4)     
           Difference    
        
HIGH-TAX  
(Top 40%)       
     PTROE Average                    0.2928                         0.2974        (0.0046)  
     TAX Average                    0.1250                         0.1167          0.0083  ** 
   (n=5047)    (n=1112)     
LOW-TAX  
(Bottom 40%)       
     PTROE Average                    0.2087                         0.2027          0.0059   
     TAX Average                    0.0462                         0.0375          0.0086  *** 
   (n=5052)    (n=1108)     
Difference       
     PTROE                    0.0842  
 
***                        0.0947  ***   
     TAX                    0.0788  
 
***                        0.0792  ***   
RATIO 
(PTROE/TAX)                    1.0678                         1.1961     
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TABLE 13 Continued 
Panel I: High v. Low Gini Coefficient (GC) (NAICS 3) (median split) 
  
 Low Competition 
(High GC)    
 High Competition 
(Low GC)   Difference          
HIGH-TAX  
(Top 40%)        
     PTROE Average                    0.2931                         0.2855          0.0076  *** 
     TAX Average                    0.1215                         0.1188          0.0027  *** 
   (n=26816)    (n=25819)     
LOW-TAX  
(Bottom 40%)       
     PTROE Average                    0.2134                         0.2055          0.0079  *** 
     TAX Average                    0.0437                         0.0438        (0.0001)  
   (n=26785)    (n=25791)     
Difference       
     PTROE                    0.0797  
 
***                        0.0800  ***   
     TAX                    0.0777  
 
***                        0.0749  ***   
RATIO 
(PTROE/TAX)                    1.0252                         1.0675     
                
        
Panel J: High v. Low Gini Coefficient (NAICS 3) (Quartiles) 
  
 Low Competition 
(High GC)   
 High Competition 
(Low GC)   Difference  
        
HIGH-TAX  
(Top 40%)        
     PTROE Average                    0.2834                         0.2810          0.0024   
     TAX Average                    0.1165                         0.1169        (0.0004)  
   (n=15071)    (n=12655)     
LOW-TAX  
(Bottom 40%)       
     PTROE Average                    0.2031                         0.1915          0.0115  *** 
     TAX Average                    0.0428                         0.0433        (0.0005)  
   (n=15046)    (n=12624)     
Difference       
     PTROE                    0.0803  
 
***                        0.0894  ***   
     TAX                    0.0737  ***                        0.0736  ***   
RATIO 
(PTROE/TAX)                    1.0897                         1.2155     
68 
 
 Low Competition 
(Low Number of 
Competitors) 
 High Competition 




     PTROE Average 0.2715                0.2540               0.0174     
     TAX Average 0.1071                0.0968               0.0103     
(n=11824) (n=11934)
LOW-TAX (Bottom 40%)
     PTROE Average 0.2415                0.1788               0.0627     
     TAX Average 0.0563                0.0300               0.0263     
(n=11806) (n=11918)
Difference
     PTROE 0.0300                *** 0.0752               ***
     TAX 0.0508                *** 0.0668               ***
RATIO (PTROE/TAX) 0.5899                1.1268               
 Low Competition 
(Low Number of 
Competitors) 
 High Competition 




     PTROE Average 0.2685                0.2226               0.0458     
     TAX Average 0.1059                0.0832               0.0228     
(n=5790) (n=5954)
LOW-TAX (Bottom 40%)
     PTROE Average 0.2446                0.1726               0.0719     
     TAX Average 0.0591                0.0318               0.0273     
(n=5775) (n=5939 )
Difference
     PTROE 0.0239                *** 0.0500               ***
     TAX 0.0468                *** 0.0514               ***
RATIO (PTROE/TAX) 0.5111                0.9730               
Panel K: High v. Low Number of Competitors (Hoberg and Philips) (median split)











PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y 0.0930                *** 0.0199                * 0.0731   ***






PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y 0.1016                *** 0.2149                *** (0.1133)  ***






PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y 0.0515                *** 0.0788                *** (0.0273)  ***






PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y 0.1019                *** 0.1183                *** (0.0164)  **
ROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y (0.0188)               *** 0.0205                *** (0.0393)  
Low Competition 




(High Number of 
Competitors)
(n=29533) (n=29815) Difference
PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y (0.0024)               0.0968                *** (0.0992)  ***
ROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y (0.0273)               *** (0.0129)              ** (0.0144)  *
Panel E: High v. Low Number of Competitors (Hoberg and Philips) (median split)
TABLE 14: CORRELATIONS (Additional Competition Measures)
Panel A: High v. Low CR4 (NAICS 3 and SIC 3) (median split)
Panel B: High v. Low CR4 (NAICS 3 and SIC 3) (Quartiles)
Panel C: High v. Low Gini Coefficient (GC) (NAICS 3) (median split)




(Low Number of 
Competitors)
High Competition 
(High Number of 
Competitors)
(n=14452) (n=14865) Difference
PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y (0.0114)                   0.0543                      *** (0.0657)  ***
ROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y (0.0131)                   (0.0318)                    *** 0.0187   
Panel F: High v. Low Number of Competitors (Hoberg and Philips) (Quartiles)
This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between PTROE and GAAP_ETR as well as 
for ROE and GAAP_ETR for firms in industries with low and high competition.  *,**,and*** indicate 
significance at the at least 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using 2-tailed tests.  High and low 
competition groups are determined by a median split for each competition measure each year.  Tests 
of differences are calculated using z-statistics.  Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, 
and NAICS (2 digit) industry level respectively.  PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL 








B 1 B 3 B 1 B 3 B 1 B 3 B 1 B 3 B 1 B 3 B 1 B 3
Keil_CR4_2 + - + + + +
Keil_CR8_2 + - + + + +
Keil_CR4_3 + - + + + + +
Keil_CR8_3 + - + + + + + +
Keil_HHI_3 -
Keil_CR4_4 + - + + + + +
Keil_CR8_4 + - + + + +
Keil_HHI_4
Keil_CR4_5 + - + - + - +
Keil_CR8_5 + - + - - +
Keil_HHI_5
GC_NAICS_2 + - + - + + + - +
GC_NAICS_3 + - + + + + + + -
GC_NAICS_4 + + + + + + + -
GC_SIC_2 + + + + - + + + -
GC_SIC_3 + + + + + + - + + + -
GC_SIC_4 + + + + + + - + + + -
GC_NAICS_5 + + + + + + - + + + -
HP_COMP + - + + + - + + +
TABLE 15: SUMMARY OF REGRESSION TESTS (Additional Competition Measures)
Panel A: PTROE, ETR Regressions






B 1 B 3 B 1 B 3 B 1 B 3 B 1 B 3 B 1 B 3 B 1 B 3
Keil_CR4_2 - - - - - -
Keil_CR8_2 - - - - -
Keil_CR4_3 - - - - - -
Keil_CR8_3 - - - - - -
Keil_HHI_3
Keil_CR4_4 - - - + - - -
Keil_CR8_4 - - - - - + -
Keil_HHI_4 - -
Keil_CR4_5 - - - - - -
Keil_CR8_5 - - - - - -
Keil_HHI_5 - -
GC_NAICS_2 - - - - - - -
GC_NAICS_3 + - - - - + - + - +
GC_NAICS_4 - - + - - - -
GC_SIC_2 - - - + - - + - +
GC_SIC_3 - + - + - + - - + - +
GC_SIC_4 - + - + - + - - - + -
GC_NAICS_5 - - + - + - - - -
HP_COMP - - - - + - -
TABLE 15 Continued
Low_10
This table summarizes the regression results for multiple regressions.  Regressions in Panel A use 
model (1), and regressions in Panel B use model (2), where HIGH_COMPVAR is substituted for a 
continuous measure (CompVar), a greater than or equal to median dummy variable for competition 
(High_50), a greater than or equal to top 25% dummy variable for competition (High_25), a less 
than 25% dummy variable for competition (Low_25), a greater than or equal to top 10% dummy 
variable for competition (High_10), and a less than 10% dummy variable for competition (Low_10).  
CompVar defines the competition variables as: Keil_CR4_X, Keil_CR8_X, Keil_HHI_X, 
GC_NAICS_X, and GC_SIC_X, where X=1,2,3,4,or 5.  This table shows the coefficient signs on 
the variables of interest.  The B 1  columns in Panel A and B show the sign of the coefficient on 
PTROE and ROE in models (1) and (2) respectively.  The B 3  column shows the sign of the 
interacted variable  PTROE or ROE and the CompVar in models(5) and (6) respectively.  +  and - 
represent a positive or negative, respectively, coefficient at the at least 10% two-tailed level of 
significance.  Note that all competition measures in this table with the exception of HP_COMP, 
higher values indicate lower competition.  See Appendix 1 for variable definitions.
Panel B: ROE, ETR Regressions





Delta Variance of Delta n
0.7673   0.0177   16,007   
0.9795   0.0183   6,833     
Delta Variance of Delta n
0.7578   0.0184   12,622   
0.8391   0.0174   2,225     
0.9891   0.0172   4,059     
0.4267   0.0196   2,774     
Delta Variance of Delta n
0.9591   0.0184   67,002   
0.8718   0.0157   64,510   
Delta Variance of Delta n
0.8896   0.0166   37,646   
0.9742   0.0207   27,119   
0.8631   0.0176   32,911   





PANEL C: HIGH v. LOW Gini Coefficient (GC) (NAICS 3) (<50%,>=50%)
Low Competition 
High Competition 




PANEL B: CR4 Low to High Competition  (NAICS3 and SIC3) (25% groups)
TABLE 16: DIRECT ESTIMATION OF IMPLICIT TAXES (Additional Competition Measures)







Delta Variance of Delta n
0.9683   0.0172   29,533   
0.8964   0.0123   29,815   
Delta Variance of Delta n
0.9894   0.0175   14,452   
0.8159   0.0169   15,081   
0.7099   0.0152   14,680   







PANEL E: HIGH v. LOW Number of Competitiors (Hoberg and Philips) 
Low Competition 
High Competition 




=tax preferences = (T*-GAAP_ETR)/(1-T*)
=industry average λ, where λ is calculated for each FF48 industry, and then 
(50-75%)
Highest Competition 
Using Maximum Likelihood Estimation, this table directly estimates the magnitude of implicit 
taxes for each group (above and below median competition measures, and groups by quartile) by 
calculating delta (δ) using model (3) as shown below. Groups (1)-(4) are formed based on 
competition measure quartiles by year with (1) representing the highest quartile competition 
variable, and (4) representing the lowest competition variable.  Group (1) includes firms in 
industries with ≥ 75th percentile of the competition variable, Group (2) includes firms in industries 
with  ≥ 50th percentile and < 75th percentile of the competition variable, Group (3) includes firms 
in industries with ≥ 25th percentile and <50th percentile of the competition variable, and Group (4) 
includes firms in industries with <25th percentile of the competition variable.  See appendix for 
variable definitions.Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, and industry level 
respectively.  PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS, LEVERAGE, CAP, INV, 
and RD are winsorized at 1% and 99%. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions.
=Industry average ROE.
=equilibrium tax rate = year average
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